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Introduction
The problem with the two statements about 
Sherlock Holmes is that we want to say that 
both of them are true but it looks like they 
cannot both be true at the same time. If it 
is true that Sherlock does not exist, then we 
would have to accept that Conan Doyle cre-
ated something that does not exist. If so, did 
he really create something? Some possible 
responses here seem to lead us into deep 
waters. In particular, those responses admit-
ting that there are ‘different types of truth’ 
generate a large number of extremely diffi-
cult problems which I lack space to discuss 
here. Other responses consider whether there 
might be different sorts of existence, and this 
is the type of response I will be examining. In 
particular, I will argue that ficta – all fictional 
entities including characters such as Sherlock 
Holmes – are non-existence concrete objects.
I consider the case of Sherlock Holmes 
partly because he is traditionally chosen in 
the literature and partly because he is one of 
the most well-known fictional characters. In 
general, I think the argument I make should 
apply to all fictional characters. A benefit 
of using the character Holmes is that he is 
richly and vivaciously specified which would 
not be true of all characters. Imagine that I 
make up a story about Barg the dragon, and 
the entire story is: ‘Barg was a dragon. The 
End.’ The character Barg is woefully under-
specified. It is likely that you will make up 
properties that Barg has that I, the author 
have not given him. You will probably think 
Short, T L 2014 How can we reconcile the following apparent truths: 
‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan 
Doyle’? Opticon1826, (16): 8, pp. 1-9, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/opt.bs
RESEARCH ARTICLE
How can we reconcile the following apparent 
truths: ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ and 
‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan 
Doyle’?
Tim L. Short*
* Department of Philosophy, UCL, United Kingdom 
t.short@ucl.ac.uk
I will argue that the two statements can be reconciled by Parsons's view which is 
inspired by a Meinongian ontology. I will assume these views together with Parsons's 
classification of fictional properties as ‘nuclear’ and ‘extra-nuclear’. This division 
of properties into types eliminates the requirement for the view to associate an 
object with a set of properties {goldenness, mountain-hood, existence} which is 
important as there is no existent golden mountain. I will throughout use italics for 
the names of properties and braces for sets. The titular question is a well-known 
problem for views of ficta since it appears that we believe both claims are true 
but they seem to be inconsistent. I understand 'ficta' to be any object or person 
described in fiction. I will argue that we can resolve the tension by adopting 
Parsons's view of ficta.
MDCCCXXVI
OPTICON
Short: How can we reconcile the following apparent truthsArt. 8, page 2 of 9
that he can fly and breathe fire, for example. 
What this brings out is that Barg has impos-
sible properties, which provides an initial 
indication that fictional characters may just 
be possible sets of properties, rather than 
sets of possible properties, as I will set out 
below. The other relevant questions of inter-
est, which I can only raise and not answer 
here, is what do we say about the properties 
that you as reader ascribe to Barg? Are you 
now the author? Are those properties on the 
same footing as the ones I gave him? 
We might also consider in this vein the 
questions arising from Booth’s concept of 
the ‘unreliable narrator’ (Booth 1983: 339 
et seq). What are we to say about properties 
ascribed to characters by a narrator who is 
known to sometimes make false ascriptions? 
Further, flirting with oxymoron, can we 
allow that the author may not be authori-
tative? There are also questions of this type 
raised by irony in fiction. Currie argues for 
a pretence theory of irony, wherein fictional 
characters are pretending to do one thing 
while actually doing the opposite (Currie 
2010). For example, if Holmes says some-
thing to Watson – as he frequently does 
– like ‘I am once more amazed by the bril-
liance of your powers of deduction!’ it looks 
very much like Watson now has the property 
of did not exhibit brilliant powers of deduc-
tion even though the text appears to do the 
exact opposite, before interpretation by us. I 
will call all of these sorts of question ‘Booth 
questions’; they will become relevant when 
we consider the properties characters have. 
These questions make it plausible that it 
may not be precisely specified what proper-
ties characters have.
Returning to the central question, we may 
examine the ontologies available to us. Both 
Parsons (1975, 1979) and Meinong (1904) 
admit non-existent concrete objects to their 
ontology. These non-existent objects are 
associated with sets of properties. According 
to Parsons’s view, which I will defend, ficta 
are associated with sets of properties with 
which no existent object need be associated. 
The ficta are non-existent concrete objects 
while the sets, as with all sets, are abstracta. I 
will assume without argument that abstracta 
like sets exist – they are real – but they are 
not concrete. I understand the term ‘con-
crete’ to refer to all objects that have a deter-
minate location in space-time. I will assume 
that the division is exhaustive – anything not 
concrete is abstract. 
I will consider some implications of 
Parsons’s view and some objections to 
it. Since Parsons’s view is opposed to 
Creationism, it will be important to consider 
arguments for Creationism, since to the 
extent they are successful they are pro tanto 
objections to Parsons’s view. Creationism in 
relation to ficta holds that authors create 
them. (We should note, for the avoidance of 
doubt, that we are not discussing the type of 
Creationism that is opposed to evolutionary 
theories.) Against this, Parsons’s view holds 
that the sets associated with ficta are not 
brought into existence by an act of creation 
because they do not have existence in the 
same way that objects in the real world do. 
The mode of existence that ficta do have – 
as with other sets or abstracta in general – 
is timeless and so authors do not give them 
that mode of existence. Rather, authors 
specify an abstract object by listing some of 
its properties. What Conan Doyle does when 
he writes about Sherlock Holmes is to specify 
him – more precisely, to determine some of 
the properties that Holmes has as a fictional 
object, which means to determine the prop-
erties that are in the set associated with the 
term ‘Holmes’.
One of the properties that Holmes has 
is that he plays the violin. This means that 
plays the violin is one of the properties that 
is a member of the set associated with the 
term ‘Holmes’. Holmes does not play the 
cello. There is a very similar entity to Holmes 
– let us call him Cholmes – who shares all 
of Holmes’s properties with the exception 
that Cholmes does not play the violin and 
does play the cello. According to Parsons’s 
view of ficta, both are non-existent concrete 
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objects. One – Holmes – was specified by 
Conan Doyle and the other – Cholmes – was 
not1. In the ontology of Parsons’s view, being 
described by a set of properties is sufficient 
to be an object, but not sufficient to exist. 
Thus, some items in the world possess the 
properties blackness and cat-hood, and so 
there are existent objects in the world which 
are black cats. On the other hand, no item in 
the world possesses the properties of gold-
enness and mountain-hood. While golden 
mountains are objects, because that set 
can be specified, there is no existing golden 
mountain. Both Cholmes and Holmes also 
fall into that latter category of being non-
existent objects because there is no object 
in the world which has all the properties of 
Holmes or Cholmes.
The sets associated with ficta exist but are 
not concrete, as are sets in general. This divi-
sion of the real into the domains of concreta 
and abstracta together with the observation 
that we allow of entities in both domains 
that they exist has a major benefit. The divi-
sion allows us to reconcile the truth of the 
two statements in the title. They are both 
true but in different domains of truth. When 
we say that ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’, 
we mean ‘Sherlock Holmes is not a concrete 
object’, and this is true in the domain of 
concreta. There is no existent human with 
all of the specified properties. When we 
say ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan 
Doyle’, we mean that ‘the set associated with 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ was specified by Conan 
Doyle’; this is also true, but has application in 
the domain of abstracta2. In the form of a set, 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ is as real as other sets are3.
Parsons’s view is not Creationism
We may establish that Parsons’s view is not 
Creationism by considering the following 
definition of the latter term. 
Creationism: fictional entities ‘are cre-
ated […] by the authors of the novels 
in which they first appear’ (Brock 
2010: 338).
By this definition, Parsons’s view is not Crea-
tionism, since authorial acts do not change 
ontology and nothing abstract changes its 
status in terms of existence, lack of exist-
ence or mode of existence. A fictional char-
acter is a man-made artefact. Parson’s view 
is anti-Creationist, and several objections 
have been made generally against all anti-
Creationist views. I will seek to show though 
that Parson’s view is not only distinct from 
Creationism but superior to it. For this rea-
son, I challenge several of the objections to 
anti-Creationism below4.
The ‘man-made artefact’ that Parsons’s 
view can recognise is a term whose asso-
ciation has been introduced by conven-
tion; this term then behaves like a name 
in that it is associated with a set of prop-
erties. Thus, Conan Doyle does not create 
Holmes; he arranges that ‘Holmes’ is asso-
ciated with a set and determines some of 
the properties in that set. If it is possible 
for authors to introduce characters without 
properties, then they associate a term with 
an empty set.
Objections
Property objections
It may be that there is some lack of clarity 
in the specification of properties. This is 
acknowledged by Parsons and used as a chal-
lenge by van Inwagen (1977). The ‘Booth 
questions’ I listed above would also become 
relevant here, because they seem to allow for 
exactly this lack of clarity. We can address this 
by understanding the question as whether 
a set of properties must contain either a 
property F or its negation not-F as one of its 
members. It is however not the case that a 
set of properties must contain F or not-F; a 
set of properties may be incomplete in this 
way. The purported violation of the laws of 
logic draws on the intuition that everything 
is either F or not F. This may be true for all 
real objects, but even then, that says noth-
ing about what properties must be in a set of 
properties. The set of properties {mountain-
hood, goldenness} is a well-constructed set 
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that does not have either silverness or not-
silverness as a member.
Another objection to Parsons’s view is 
that objects have properties that cannot 
be instantiated together. As Salmon (1998: 
293) writes ‘the Object […], as in the case of 
the round square, may even have inconsist-
ent properties.’ However, this is to confuse 
a powerful objection with reference to the 
actual world with an objection that has no 
force with reference to the world of sets. It 
would indeed be an objection to the exist-
ence of an object in the real world to note 
that it has non-compossible properties. We 
could for example ask whether the round 
square has corners or not. Since it is round, it 
does not. Since it is square, it does. The round 
square would generate many contradictions, 
were it to exist. However, this is not what the 
proponent of Parsons’s view means. He does 
not believe that there is a round square to be 
found in the world in exactly the same way 
as he does not believe that the golden moun-
tain has the property of existence. What 
he does hold is that there is a non-existent 
object associated with the set including the 
properties of roundness and squareness. 
Since that set does exist in the way that sets 
exist and does not exist in the way that con-
creta exist, Salmon’s objection fails.
Indeterminacy of identity objection
Parsons’s view is a realist view because the 
sets associated with ficta are real. Some 
authors have objected that any realist 
account of ficta will suffer from a possible 
situation where it is indeterminate whether 
two fictional characters are identical. For 
example, Everett (2005) believes it is inde-
terminate whether the Faust of Marlowe 
is identical to that of Goethe. The realist is 
held to be especially exposed to the problem 
because indeterminacy of identity cannot 
apply in the real world.
This objection has no force against 
Parsons’s view, because it is clear when two 
characters are identical. In the very unlikely 
circumstance that two authors specified the 
same set by giving their characters exactly the 
same set of properties, then they are identi-
cal characters. Otherwise, they are not. There 
is no indeterminacy here at least on the sur-
face. The opponent may sharpen their objec-
tion here by asking whether two characters 
are identical if all of their specified proper-
ties are the same but one of the unspecified 
ones is not. But bringing this challenge would 
require a coherent exposition of what it 
means for a character to have a property that 
is at once specified and unspecified.
A similar response is available to the pro-
ponent of Parsons’s view if it is urged that 
there is a difficulty with two characters 
where within the story it is left indetermi-
nate whether they are identical. Again, they 
are not identical unless they are given all 
of the same properties. In the example of 
Frackworld given by Everett (2005: 629 et 
seq), it is said that there are some ‘striking 
differences’ between two allegedly indeter-
minately identical characters. If we accept 
Parsons’s view, these differences are suffi-
cient to distinguish the characters. Similarly, 
there is no indeterminacy about whether a 
Slynx exists -- in circumstances where it is 
deliberately left indeterminate as to whether 
the Slynx exists within that story. According 
to Parsons’s view, it does exist, as a set. There 
may be indeterminacy as to which set has 
been associated with the term `Slynx’ by 
the author of a story in which it is indeter-
minate whether the Slynx exists. Such inde-
terminacy however is not problematic for 
Parsons’s view. The indeterminacy is harm-
less because an indeterminacy with which a 
set is associated does not involve indetermi-
nacy of identity.
Creativity denial objection
Creationism is commonly defended by not-
ing the intuition we have that there is a 
great deal of ‘creativity’ involved in being the 
author of a fiction; in being the ‘creator’ of a 
vibrant fictional character. The charge is that 
this creativity is not sufficiently recognised 
or given sufficient weight on a view in which 
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the set of properties is not created. Parsons’s 
view can avoid this charge though. The view 
does not in any way devalue the ‘creativity’ 
involved in authoring a novel or other work 
of art. There can be a great deal of skill and 
talent involved in specifying the properties of 
a set so that the associated character is arrest-
ing or entertaining. The author has indeed 
created something - an association of a term 
with a pre-existing set - and has in addition 
exercised artistic skill in selecting which set it 
shall be, by virtue of deciding which proper-
ties the fictional entity will have.
One objection here may be to note that 
according to Parsons’s view, an author may 
create a term or use a pre-existing term. This 
frequently happens; authors often write new 
stories containing ficta from previously writ-
ten stories. In Parsons’s view, this just means 
that the term ‘Holmes’ may alter its associ-
ation to be with a new set with some new 
properties. The obvious counter support-
ing Parsons’s view is a ‘first use’ response, 
whereby an author first associates a term 
with a set the first time a character is named. 
Moreover, the set with which a term is associ-
ated changes every time a character is given 
a property, and not just the first time. This 
avoids an asymmetry between first and other 
uses of a term.
Rigidity mismatch objection
Defenders of Creationism have argued that 
fictional objects cannot be sets because 
there is a temporal and modal rigidity mis-
match between sets and fictions. Lee Walters 
(2012: 92) argues: 
[l]iterary fictions […] cannot be iden-
tified with any number of concrete 
instances of the fiction, since no par-
ticular instance or instances of a fic-
tion are required for the continued 
existence of the fiction. This fact also 
rules out identifying fictions with plu-
ralities [or] sets […] concrete given the 
temporal and modal rigidity of […] set 
membership. 
The objection notes that set membership 
conditions are temporally and modally rigid. 
Temporal rigidity means that the identity of 
a set supervenes on its members at all times. 
Modal rigidity means that a set has the same 
elements in any worlds in which it exists, irre-
spective of how anything else is or could be. 
So the two claims amount to the view that 
in discussing sets, once we have identified 
a particular set by specifying its members, 
nothing else affects which set it is. 
The mismatch objection then becomes the 
claim that Sherlock Holmes is not temporally 
and modally rigid while sets are. If so, then if 
Conan Doyle had counterfactually specified 
that Holmes played the cello, then he would 
still have been talking about the same fic-
tional character. Yet to say this is to beg the 
question against Parsons’s view, since for the 
proponent of that view, Sherlock Holmes in 
one sense is a set, and Conan Doyle would in 
those circumstances have been talking about 
Cholmes not Holmes. It is likely that those 
who are mereological essentialists in relation 
to concrete objects will also be essentialists 
in relation to ficta. Holmes could not have 
been Cholmes, and one set could not have 
been another set. 
An objector might say it is counterintui-
tive to argue that Holmes could not have 
been Cholmes. This objection is mistaken 
however. It is certainly true that Conan Doyle 
could have decided that his character could 
have been a cello player, and he could have 
named that character ‘Holmes’. What he 
could not have done though, is change the 
members of the set originally associated with 
the term ‘Holmes.’ He could only have associ-
ated the term ‘Holmes’ with the set we are 
now associating with ‘Cholmes’. 
Creationists claim correctly that a particular 
novel could have first been instantiated in a 
different format. Note that A Study in Scarlet 
– that very work – could have first been writ-
ten on a different piece of paper. Parsons’s 
view can go along with this. But that is not to 
allow that A Study in Scarlet could have been 
different. Certainly a story could have been 
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written with different characteristics. And 
certainly it could have been called A Study in 
Scarlet. But the set now associated with that 
term could only ever have the members it 
currently has. This shows how Parsons’s view 
avoids a cost that the Creationist must pay, 
which is to allow that once created, ficta exist 
forever. This is the same as saying that time-
less objects can come into existence, which 
is a strange asymmetry. If something can be 
created, then surely it ought to be possible to 
destroy it as well.
It might be countered here that this is not 
so strange because of the asymmetries that 
arise in relation to facts about the past. Until 
a particular event occurred, there was no 
fact; but once it has, it is always a fact that 
it has, and nothing could then destroy that 
fact. However, there does not seem to be a 
close analogy between the actions involved 
in the two cases. If I create a fact now by act-
ing in a certain way, then perhaps it will be a 
fact forever that I did so. On the Creationist 
view, if I create a character now by conduct-
ing whatever acts the Creationist specifies as 
sufficient, that character exists forever. In the 
former case, I act but I do not act in order 
to create a fact. If I create a character on the 
Creationist view, then I act specifically to cre-
ate something which is then eternal. This 
seems quite a potent act of creation for a per-
son to be able to perform: to be able to cre-
ate deliberately the eternal. On balance, it is 
more useful to take Parsons’s view, by which 
ficta are indeed timeless objects and are so at 
all times, as is appropriate.
Revision of abstract individuals objection
Creationism has also been defended by not-
ing that we commonly talk about changes in 
abstracta. This would be a problem for Par-
sons’s view in which no abstract items are cre-
ated or changed. One purported example of 
change in abstracta is that the laws of cricket 
are revised from time to time. Yet this is bet-
ter seen as meaning not that the abstract 
object associated with the term ‘the Laws of 
Cricket’ has changed any of its characteris-
tics, but that the association of the term has 
been modified. The term is now associated 
with a set different from the original set in 
that the new set includes some new proper-
ties reflecting the rule changes. No abstract 
objects have changed. (It is no objection here 
that the term is an abstract object which has 
changed because it is now associated with a 
different set, because this relational property 
alteration is merely Cambridge change – i.e. 
relational only.)
This situation is analogous in relation to 
ficta. No new properties are instantiated nor 
are any new abstracta created, when Conan 
Doyle introduces a new property for Holmes. 
What he has done is alter the set associated 
with the term ‘Holmes’ -- as opposed to cre-
ating or modifying a set. If it is specified 
in a certain work that Holmes likes cricket, 
what this means is that the association of 
the term ‘Holmes’ has been shifted to a set 
slightly different set from the previous one. 
The new set is the one composed of all the 
properties in the previous set plus the prop-
erty of likes cricket.
It may be objected here that Parsons’s 
view cannot handle a situation where Conan 
Doyle subsequently revises this property 
because we could not say which set was asso-
ciated with the term ‘Holmes’, and in par-
ticular, whether it contains the property of 
likes cricket. However, this would again be to 
confuse the timeless nature of the sets asso-
ciated with and the changeable nature of the 
relations of the terms associated with them. 
Parsons’s view can be defended in each of the 
situations mentioned. The process is simply 
explained by saying that one set is associated 
with before the change and a different one 
afterwards5. Parsons’s view avoids some dif-
ficult questions for Creationists; viz., when 
and how are ficta created? After all, Brock 
(2010) founds his challenge to Creationism 
on the difficulty of these questions. What 
suffices to create a character? Would a char-
acter that was only named be created? These 
questions all have straightforward answers 
in Parsons’s view. No abstracta are created at 
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any point. An occurrence of a term associates 
it with a set. If no properties are specified, 
then the term is associated with an empty 
set. As properties are added, the term is asso-
ciated with different sets. 
Further benefits abound. There is no inde-
terminacy about the number of fictional 
characters, since the proponent of Parsons’s 
view does not look to actual works of fiction 
to determine that number. There is no dif-
ficulty for Parsons’s view in analysing claims 
such as ‘the Odysseus of The Odyssey and 
the Ulysses of Tennyson’s Ulysses are the 
same fictional character’. It will be unlikely 
that they are in fact identical. A necessary 
condition would be that both authors have 
arranged that their terms shall refer to the 
same set i.e. the fictional characters will have 
the same properties. However, Parsons’s 
view has no difficulty accommodating the 
possible truth of claims such as ‘Tennyson’s 
character was based on the character in The 
Odyssey’. All such claims reduce to claims 
about the sets involved. They mean that the 
two sets associated with the terms by the two 
authors contain many identical properties.
Finally, Creationism may collapse into 
something like Parsons’s view under some 
circumstances. Imagine a computer pro-
gramme populated with all conceivable prop-
erties, and arranged to name an extremely 
large number of sets of combinations of 
those properties and print out the results. 
Presumably then the Creationist universe of 
abstracta would resemble the Meinongian. 
It would admittedly not be infinite, but only 
for contingent reasons relating to the time 
available to run the programme. That would 
scarcely suffice for the Creationist to charge 
the Meinongian with ontological profligacy.
Conclusion
The two statements in the title may be rec-
onciled by understanding them as follows. 
‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ means that 
there are no existent objects with all of the 
properties in the set of properties associ-
ated with the term ‘Sherlock Holmes’. This is 
true. ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan 
Doyle’ means that Conan Doyle through his 
work specified the set of properties associ-
ated with the term ‘Sherlock Holmes’. This 
is also true. The disambiguation we need 
of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is between Sherlock 
Holmes (1) the fictional man in the story, 
and Sherlock Holmes (2) the set of proper-
ties associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’. It is 
true that Sherlock Holmes (1) does not exist 
because there is no such man in the real 
world. It is also true though that Sherlock 
Holmes (2) does exist because Sherlock Hol-
mes (2) is a set which has had its elements 
specified; the set is real. Sherlock Holmes (2) 
was associated with a set by Conan Doyle. So 
there is no conflict between the statements 
because they refer to different entities: Sher-
lock Holmes (1) is not identical to Sherlock 
Holmes (2).
We are also now in a position to deal with 
problems mentioned in the literature in rela-
tion to true negative existential statements. 
Note that one commentator writes that she 
will ignore true negative existential state-
ments such as ‘Iago does not exist’ because 
they are ‘problematic on every theory’ (Friend 
2007: 143). The fact that Parsons’s view can 
handle true negative existentials very easily 
is therefore a major point in its favour. This 
advantage of course has carried through 
from the more widely applicable benefit of 
the Meinongian ontology – as Reicher (2010: 
3.1) puts it: ‘[t]he appeal to nonexistent 
objects thus supplies an elegant solution to 
the problem of negative singular existentials’ 
– but is none the less valuable for that.
The reason for the difficulties is that we 
seem to be referring to something when 
we discuss the purportedly ‘empty terms’ 
of ficta. Moreover, we seem to be referring 
to distinct objects when we say ‘Zeus is not 
identical to Pegasus’. The solution is that we 
are indeed referring to distinct non-existent 
objects that are associated with different 
existent sets. ‘Zeus’ is associated with one set 
and ‘Pegasus’ with another. These are differ-
ent ficta for many reasons including that the 
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first set includes the property is divine and 
the second set does not. So in this view, we 
can retain the truth of the negative existen-
tial statements. It is true that Zeus is not real, 
although the set associated with ‘Zeus’ is real 
- and also the distinction between different 
unreal objects6.
Parsons’s view is the correct view of ficta 
and it explains how the two statements in 
the title question can both be true.
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Notes
 1 We might allow that authors ‘identify’ 
sets rather than specifying them if we 
accept that authors associate terms with 
exactly one set. Alternatively, they specify 
a group of sets if we include sets with 
properties not listed by the author as also 
associated. For example, we might allow 
the property renate to Holmes even if 
Conan Doyle makes no mention of this.
 2 While it is indeed true that Conan Doyle’s 
act of specification takes place in the 
domain of concreta, we are not interested 
in that but only in what effects his acts 
have in terms of associating a term with a 
set in the domain of abstracta.
 3 Even if this runs counter to appearances, 
that would not count against the view. 
As Thomasson ( 2003: 205) notes, ‘since 
there are apparent inconsistencies, any 
consistent theory must give up appear-
ances somewhere’. Some might also 
object here that it is undesirable to regard 
ficta as associated with sets because the 
view is committed to statements like ‘the 
null set is a subset of Sherlock Holmes’. 
This does indeed appear undesirable, but 
only because of our habit of regarding 
Holmes as a man, who cannot have sub-
sets in any useful sense. When we regard 
the term ‘Holmes’ as associated with a 
set, there is no problem. Indeed, if an 
author names a character but gives him 
no properties, he associates a term with 
the null set.
 4 As Brock (2010: 343) points out, some 
varieties of Creationism – those defended 
by Deutsch which hold that specification 
of a pre-existing character suffices for its 
creation – will be compatible with Par-
sons’s view. I will not consider this fur-
ther because I agree with Brock that the 
absence of a new entity means no crea-
tion has taken place. Some might deny 
that Deutsch qualifies as a Creationist 
because his view is too similar to the one 
I defend here.
 5 A further objection here to Parsons’s 
view is that if characters are to be associ-
ated with sets, and ‘Holmes’ is associated 
with a different set at different times, 
how do we know that the two Holm-
es’s are the same character? For lack of 
space, I cannot go into detail here but 
authorial intention would play a role in 
the solution.
 6 It might be objected here that an author 
could write a story about a number that 
does not exist -- for example, an even 
prime not identical to two. What are we 
saying when we say this does not exist? 
This is simply dealt with by noting that 
there is no concrete or abstract item 
which is an even prime not identical to 
two. What there is, in Parsons’s view, is a 
non-existent object which is associated 
with the set containing the properties is 
even, is prime and is identical to two.
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